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WHEN MISREPRESENTATION 
BECOMES DECEPTIVE: ANALYZING 
PETITION-SIGNER INADVERTENCE 
POST-CAMPBELL 




In 2010, the Alaska supreme court held that a legally deficient petition 
summary of a ballot initiative could be corrected and put on the ballot without 
being recirculated for signatures. The Parental Involvement Initiative at the 
root of the litigation would prohibit doctors from performing abortions for 
unemancipated minor women who had not provided notice to or obtained 
consent from a parent. After the petition was circulated for signatures, the 
supreme court determined that omissions of fact in the petition summary 
rendered the summary inaccurate and therefore deficient. However, the court 
refused to require that the initiative sponsors recirculate the petition with a 
corrected summary upon a determination that the deficient summary was 
unlikely to have led to petition-signer inadvertence. This Comment critiques 
the supreme court’s analysis of petition-signer inadvertence and proposes a 
more robust standard that advances the policy goals the court has considered 
when evaluating ballot initiatives. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Planned Parenthood v. Campbell,1 the Alaska supreme court 
considered whether supporters of a defective petition summary must 
recirculate it before a cured version is placed on the ballot.2 Upon a 
challenge that the petition summary was defective, the supreme court 
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 1.  232 P.3d 725(Alaska 2010). 
 2.  Id. at 727. The petition summary, “The Parental Involvement Initiative: 
An act relating to parental involvement for a minor’s abortion,” (PNI) would 
prohibit doctors from performing abortions for unemancipated minor women 
who had not provided notice to or obtained consent from a parent. 
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held that it was not necessary to correct and recirculate the petition 
because petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely or minimal.3 However, 
the supreme court failed to engage in a clear analysis of petition-signer 
inadvertence. 
The Comment addresses that failure and argues that courts should 
apply a standard that ensures petition signatures accurately reflect public 
opinion and are not the result of misleading petitions. Part II details the 
case history of Campbell. Part III discusses the policy reasons for analyzing 
deficient petition summaries through petition-signer inadvertence by 
examining previous cases before the supreme court. Part IV develops a 
standard that courts ought to apply in determining whether petition-
signer inadvertence occurs and argues that the supreme court incorrectly 
determined that the petition summary in Campbell did not need to be 
recirculated. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In Campbell, the court sought to resolve whether a deficient petition 
summary could be cured for a ballot summary without its sponsors 
circulating new petitions and gathering new signatures.4 The petition 
sponsors submitted “The Parental Involvement Initiative: An Act relating 
to parental involvement for a minor’s abortion” (PNI) to the lieutenant 
governor.5 The PNI would prohibit doctors from performing abortions 
for unemancipated minor women who had not provided notice to or 
obtained consent from a parent.6 
The PNI was proposed as an amendment to the Parental Consent Act 
(PCA), a similar statute requiring parental consent or judicial 
authorization before a doctor performed an abortion on a unmarried or 
emancipated woman who was under the age of 17.7 The PCA was 
invalidated for violating the minor’s right to privacy under the Alaska 
constitution because it was not the least restrictive means available to 
accomplish the state’s legitimate interest in “protecting the health of the 
minor and in fostering family involvement in a minor’s decision 
regarding her pregnancy.”8 
When the petition sponsors submitted the PNI, the lieutenant 
governor certified the application, and the Division of Elections prepared 
 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 728. 
37.2 ENGLISH-GRAY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2021  4:05 PM 
2020 WHEN MISREPRESENTATION BECOMES DECEPTIVE 273 
the necessary materials for signature-gathering.9 Planned Parenthood of 
Alaska filed suit in the superior court against the lieutenant governor, 
alleging that he had violated both the statutory and constitutional law of 
Alaska by “certifying the application and adopting a defective 
summary.”10 Planned Parenthood claimed that the PNI was 
“incomprehensible and would mislead voters” and that the summary was 
not impartial or accurate as required by law.11 
Reviewing Planned Parenthood’s claims, the superior court held that 
the PNI was not clearly unconstitutional but was not impartial or accurate 
due to the omission of three key facts.12 First, the summary omitted the 
fact that the PNI would restrict current law because current law does not 
require parental notification for a minor to get an abortion.13 Second, the 
summary failed to disclose that the PNI was modifying the PCA by 
requiring parental notification.14 Finally, the PNI omitted the fact that the 
initiative would implicate other laws that make it a criminal offense when 
a physician knowingly violates the notification requirements for giving 
the minor’s parents notice of the minor’s plan to have an abortion.15 The 
superior court held that if the omitted facts were included in a revised 
summary for the ballot, the initiative could be placed on the ballot.16 
Planned Parenthood appealed, arguing that the summary could not be 
corrected for the ballot without recirculating a revised summary and 
gathering new signatures.17 
Practically, correcting and recirculating a new summary would have 
allowed signers to reconsider their endorsement of the initiative with a 
clearer explanation of the initiative. Thus, it would have been possible 
that the initiative would not have gotten enough signatures to be placed 
on the ballot at all. In contrast, correcting the summary for the ballot 
would not allow for this reconsideration. Rather, it would guarantee that 
the summary ended up on the ballot despite the fact that a clearer 
summary may have led signers to change their minds. 
The supreme court reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo 
and would only invalidate the summary if it was not impartial and 
accurate.18 The mere fact that a better summary could be written was not 
 
 9.  Id. at 727. 
 10.  Id. at 727–28. 
 11.  Id. at 728. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
37.2 ENGLISH-GRAY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2021  4:05 PM 
274 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
enough to invalidate the summary as it stood.19 The supreme court 
concluded that when dealing with initiative petitions that have been 
“circulated with a defective summary,” a court is required to consider the 
nature and degree of the omission or misleading statement to determine 
the “likelihood and extent of petition-signer inadvertence,” the hardship 
that would result from the invalidation to the sponsors, and the hardship 
that would come to the opponents from permitting the initiative to move 
forward.20 The supreme court then concluded that petition-signer 
inadvertence “was unlikely or minimal in this case.”21 Therefore, the 
supreme court found that it was not necessary to correct and recirculate 
the petition, provided that the omissions were corrected before the 
summary was placed on the ballot.22 
In his opinion concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part, Justice Winfree 
disagreed with the majority, noting that the inaccuracy of the petition 
summary violated the screening function of the signature requirement 
because it was impossible to know whether the initiative would have had 
support if it had been presented correctly.23 He noted that although the 
hardship involved in circulating a new petition is great, not requiring this 
recirculation would lessen incentives for creating impartial petition 
summaries.24 Also, it would change the screening standard from what is 
currently a bright-line rule to be dependent on the independent views of 
judges.25 Therefore, he argued that the initiative should not be included 
on the ballot and a new, accurate and impartial petition should be 
circulated.26 
III. PETITION-SIGNER INADVERTENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
This section will provide an overview of the cases that have 
discussed the policy goals of avoiding petition-signer inadvertence before 
discussing how the Campbell court applied these cases to its analysis. In 
analyzing the PNI, the supreme court relied upon severance cases, cases 
where the proposed initiative impermissibly combines two subjects and 
violates the one-subject rule, in formulating a rule for petition-signer 
inadvertence.27 Planned Parenthood argued against the applicability of 
these cases in analyzing the PNI, but the supreme court found sufficient 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 734. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 736 (Winfree, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 24.  Id. at 739. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 732–33 (majority order). 
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similarities to make the severance cases instructive to petition-signer 
inadvertence.28 In both situations, proponents of the initiatives gathered 
signatures on petitions that did not exactly represent the initiative.29 In 
both situations, it is necessary to determine whether the petitions have 
served their “screening purpose” sufficiently to allow the initiative to go 
on the ballot without requiring the recirculation of the petition.30 
Therefore, examining severance cases decided by the supreme court is 
necessary to determine the standard for petition-signer inadvertence 
applied in Campbell. 
A.  Suber v. Alaska State Bond Committee 
The Alaska constitution stipulates that “[e]very bill shall be confined 
to one subject.”31 In Suber v. Alaska State Bond Committee,32 the supreme 
court determined a chapter of a special session contained only one subject 
when it imposed both obligations on the State Commissioner of 
Commerce regarding homeowner relief following an earthquake and 
criminal sanctions for noncompliance.33 Emphasizing that the purpose 
underlying the one-subject provision is to prevent logrolling, 
“inadvertence, stealth, and fraud in legislation,” the court noted that, 
when construing a contested provision, it would “disregard mere verbal 
inaccuracies, resolve doubts in favor of validity, and hold that in order to 
warrant the setting aside of enactments for failure to comply, the violation 
must be substantial and plain.”34 Accordingly, the court reasoned that 
because the purpose of the criminal sanctions provision was to ensure 
compliance with the homeowner relief provision, the sanctions provision 
was sufficiently germane to the subject matter of the legislation for it to 
adhere to the one-subject rule.35 The standards set out in Suber for 
determining inadvertence are helpful in determining whether the court 
in Campbell properly held that petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely. 
B.  Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections 
The supreme court’s analysis of a one-subject rule challenge to an 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 733. 
 30.  Id. (quoting Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1219 
(Alaska 1993)). 
 31.  ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 8. 
 32.  414 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1966). 
 33. Id. at 549, 557. 
 34.  Id. at 557. 
 35.  Id. 
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initiative in Meyer v. Alaskans for Better Elections36 clarifies the policy goals 
of the one-subject rule and reflects the general tendency in one-subject 
cases to permit subjects that fall under a single broad category.37 In Meyer, 
the court determined that an initiative that would make three discrete 
substantive changes to election law was permissible when the three 
changes fell under one general subject. The court noted among other 
considerations, that there was “no transparent attempt to garner voter 
support through completely unrelated provisions.”38 The court clarified 
that the test was not discreteness or severability; rather, there must be a 
factual and logical nexus between the different issues.39 Thus, the policy 
underlying the one-subject rule was empowering voters, because 
allowing them to vote on different issues separately would lead to a more 
precise expression of their will.40 This policy informs the goal of avoiding 
petition-signer inadvertence as well, as petition-signer inadvertence 
could prevent a precise expression of a signer’s will. 
C.  Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of 
Anchorage 
The court reiterated a focus on voter empowerment in Citizens for 
Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of Anchorage,41 where the 
supreme court held that the clerk properly denied a petition that was 
“confusing and misleading and therefore legally insufficient.”42 The 
petition was unclear whether it would create or abolish rights relating to 
the use of medical marijuana. Therefore, signers had to infer the effects of 
the petition.43 The court, noting the principle of informed lawmaking that 
underlies all petition requirements,44 held that the lack of context 
 
 36.  465 P.3d 477 (Alaska 2020). 
 37.  E.g., Croft v. Parnell, 236 P.3d 369, 372–73 (Alaska 2010) (explaining that 
the court tends to interpret the one-subject rule broadly in order to balance the 
purposes of the rule with legislative efficiency). 
 38.  Meyer, 464 P.3d at 498. 
 39.  Id. at 492. 
 40.  See id. at 498 (citing Croft, 236 P.2d at 372) (in the initiative context the one-
subject rule, “protects the voters’ ability to effectively exercise their right to vote 
by requiring that different proposals be voted on separately,” “allows voters to 
express their will through their votes more precisely,” and “prevents logrolling, 
stealth, and fraud.”). 
 41.  119P.3d 898 (Alaska 2006). 
 42.  Id. at 899. 
 43.  Id. at 903. 
 44.  Id. The court in Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana was referring 
to the decision in Faipeas, which noted that there is a “vital public interest in 
ensuring that laws be made by informed lawmakers.” Decision-makers should 
have a thorough understanding of all sides of an issue so that they can make a 
reasoned and rational decision. The court noted that this understanding requires 
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surrounding the medical marijuana petition was legally insufficient 
because signers “could not know with sufficient certainty what they were 
endorsing.”45 The holding in Medical Marijuana suggests that 
inadvertence also occurs when a voter could not know, without having to 
draw inferences from the surrounding context, the effect of a petition 
when endorsing it. 
D.  Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage 
Similarly, the policy surrounding the non-allowance of a deficient 
petition summary centers on the importance of an informed electorate. 
For example, in Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage,46 Citizens Against the 
Homosexual Ordinance filed a petition for a referendum on an ordinance 
that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation for public 
employment.47 Opponents of the ordinance appealed the clerk’s 
certification of the petition, seeking a stay of the election pending the final 
decision of their appeal.48 Granting the stay, the supreme court found that 
the ordinance was misleading because it could be interpreted by 
proponents as adding sexual orientation to the list of characteristics 
protected from discrimination in public employment, or by opponents as 
giving special rights to homosexuals.49 The court explained that the 
signature-gathering requirement to submit a referendum ensures that a 
bill has sufficient public support before being placed on the ballot.50 A 
petition that mischaracterizes the ordinance thwarts the intended 
screening function of the signature-gathering requirement.51 The court 
noted that having a properly informed electorate is “a basic requirement 
for good governing decisions – ones which properly balance the interests 
of those involved and create desirable results.”52 Therefore, referendum 
and initiative petitions must meet minimum standards of accuracy and 
fairness to satisfy the public interest in informed lawmaking to prevent 




complete and accurate information. Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 
P.2d 1214, 1221 (Alaska 1993). 
 45.  Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 903. 
 46.  860 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1993). 
 47.  Id. at 1215. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 1217. 
 50.  Id. at 1219–20. 
 51.  Id. at 1220. 
 52.  Id. at 1221. 
 53.  Id. 
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IV. CREATING A STANDARD FOR EVALUATING PETITION-SIGNER 
INADVERTENCE 
A.  The Need for a Workable Standard 
Although the supreme court premised its Campbell decision on a 
determination that petition-signer inadvertence was “unlikely or 
minimal,” it did not engage with a clear analysis of petition-signer 
inadvertence.54 Where the supreme court has previously tested the 
sufficiency of petition summaries in the initiative context, it has similarly 
failed to articulate a clear standard to evaluate inadvertence.55 Given the 
prevalence of legislation by initiative in Alaska, a clear, consistent 
standard for courts assessing inadvertence is paramount to protect the 
democratic process.56 The supreme court’s discussion of policy goals 
underlying both the one-subject rule and deficient summaries provides a 
jumping-off point for how the court handles inadvertence. This section 
seeks to ascertain the policy goals undergirding petition-signer 
inadvertence and to crystalize these goals into a workable standard for 
future application. Both the one-subject rule and the need for fair and 
accurate summaries empower voters to express preferences in a clear and 
precise manner.57 Courts have analyzed inadvertence in cases involving 
the one-subject rule literally, centering concerns on the likelihood that a 
bill containing two distinct subjects would lead to support for one of the 
provisions falsely indicating support for the other.58 
The supreme court has focused more on ensuring that summaries 
allow voters to make decisions based on accurate and impartial 
information than it has on ensuring summaries are not deceptive.59 While 
the court holds both ballot summaries and petition summaries to the 
standard of accuracy, the purpose of ballot summaries is to allow voters 
to make “informed and intelligent” decisions while petition summaries 
 
 54.  Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 734 (Alaska 
2010). 
 55.  See, e.g., Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1221 (noting the necessity of guarding against 
petition-signer inadvertence but not explaining how to evaluate inadvertence). 
 56.  See Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, 71 P.3d 896, 898 (Alaska 2003) 
(noting that Alaska allows for voter initiatives to encourage direct democracy). 
 57.  See Croft v. Parnell, 236 P.3d 369, 372 (Alaska 2010) (explaining that the 
one-subject rule allows voters a more precise expression of their preferences); see 
also Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1221 (“The public interest in informed lawmaking requires 
that referendum and initiative petitions meet minimum standards of accuracy and 
fairness.”). 
 58.  See supra note 40. 
 59.  Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. Campbell, 232 P.3d 725, 729 (Alaska 
2010). 
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ensure the measure reflects public support.60 The court noted that when 
petition summaries exclude information that would give petition signers 
“serious grounds for reflection,” these omissions can render a petition 
inaccurate.61 Similarly, “complete and accurate information” in a petition 
summary is necessary to ensure informed lawmaking.62 
The procedural posture of the case in Campbell was unique, because 
the court confronted whether a deficient summary could be cured 
without recirculation. Before analyzing how to cure a deficient petition 
summary, the court had concluded that the summary was not complete 
and accurate.63 Accordingly, the holding that a deficient summary does 
not always lead to petition-signer inadvertence implies that the standard 
to determine inadvertence is narrower than completeness.64 
The supreme court noted in Medical Marijuana that the petition 
process serves to screen out propositions with insufficient public 
support.65 Although the court acknowledged the screening function in 
Campbell, it ignored its own analysis of the importance of legal sufficiency 
at this stage as applied in Medical Marijuana.66 There, the court explained, 
“[s]ignatures on a confusing or misleading petition therefore may or may 
not indicate support for the measure . . .,” suggesting that the importance 
of completeness of information directly relates to ensuring petition 
signatures are an effective proxy for public support.67 This concern 
comports with the idea of inadvertence that the court espoused in the 
context of the one-subject rule, which indicates petition-signer 
inadvertence occurs when a deficient summary inhibits petition signers 
from clearly expressing their preferences.68 Accordingly, when 
considering whether a petition summary contains complete information, 
courts should do so with an eye to whether a lack of completeness will 
 
 60.  Id. at 730 (citing Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc. v. State, 52 P.3d 
732, 735 (Alaska 2002)). 
 61.  Id. at 730 (citing Pebble Ltd. Partnership ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. 
Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 1082 (Alaska 2009) (quoting Alaskans for Efficient 
Government, 52 P.3d at 736)). 
 62.  See Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Alaska 
1993) (explaining that clarity and honesty in all forms of lawmaking, including 
“legislative enactments, initiative petitions and even proposed resolutions” is 
paramount). 
 63.  Campbell, 232 P.2d at 730. 
 64.  See id. at 734 (noting that while the petition summary was deficient by 
omission, it was not misleading enough to automatically require recirculation). 
 65.  Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 129 P.3d 898, 901 (Alaska 2006). 
 66.  See Campbell, 232 P.2d at 729 (explaining the screening function ensures 
that initiatives that make it to the ballot have public support, but failing to 
mention the effect that initiatives without public support on the ballot may have). 
 67.  Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 901. 
 68.  See supra note 40. 
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render signatures an insufficient indicator of public support. 
The Campbell court’s application of standards used in the one-subject 
context to determine whether a deficient petition nevertheless served its 
screening purpose highlights that the two issues implicate similar policy 
goals.69 In determining that petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely, the 
supreme court noted that the “omissions did not substantially 
misrepresent the essential nature of the PNI.”70 This resembles the 
language that courts use in determining whether severance can 
effectively remedy a violation of the one-subject rule, where courts “ask 
whether omitting the required information from the petition summary 
substantially changed—or misrepresented—the spirit of the measure.”71 
While a cursory glance at this portion of the court’s opinion may lead 
to the conclusion that it articulated a standard, the problem is that it failed 
to clearly identify the cutoff point at which a summary that is legally 
deficient can only be remedied by recirculation. The demarcation between 
an omission that would give voters “serious grounds for reflection” and 
one that “substantially . . . misrepresented . . . the spirit of the measure” 
is amorphous at best.72 Justice Winfree highlights this issue in his opinion, 
noting “a petition summary either meets our existing standards or it does 
not.”73 The lack of clarity is problematic because it opens the door to 
inconsistent application by courts, obscuring the central policy goal of 
ensuring petition signatures convey public support.74 
Because the Alaska supreme court carved out a gray area where “a 
petition summary . . . fall[s] below those existing standards but [can] be 
excused because it only falls a little bit below those standards” a stricter 
inquiry is necessary.75 An appropriate standard would incorporate the 
policy that the court articulated in Medical Marijuana, asking courts to not 
only look to whether the omission substantially changed or 
misrepresented the spirit of the measure, but also the likelihood that a 
voter’s signature would not necessarily convey support for the measure.76 
 
 69.  See Campbell, 232 P.2d at 733 (determining that two of the three factors 
that courts consider in the one-subject rule context can apply in a deficient 
summary context). 
 70.  Id. at 734. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See id. (noting that a deficient summary that would give voters “serious 
grounds for reflection” does not necessarily substantially misrepresent “the spirit 
of the measure”). 
 73.  Id. at 737 (Winfree, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 74.  See Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 129 P.3d 898, 901–02 (Alaska 2006) (explaining that signatures on 
misleading petitions may not accurately reflect public support). 
 75.  See Campbell, 232 P.2d at 737 (Winfree, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 76.  See Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 901–02 
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In doing so, courts should consider whether the initiative summary 
clearly states whether the measure creates or abolishes rights and whether 
a reasonable voter would have to infer the effect of the proposition.77 To 
that end, in determining petition-signer inadvertence, Alaskan courts 
ought to examine not only the misrepresentation contained in the petition 
summary itself, but also the extent to which that misrepresentation would 
affect voters’ ability to understand the effect of the measure. 
B. Applying the Standard to Campbell 
Given the policy goals of the screening function of the petition 
process explained in Medical Marijuana, the court incorrectly determined 
in Campbell that the deficient summary did not need to be recirculated.78 
The conclusion in Campbell underscores how an unworkable standard 
misleads courts and generates inconsistencies.79 Directly applicable to the 
issue in Campbell is the court’s determination in Medical Marijuana that the 
proposed initiative was ambiguous about whether it created or restricted 
rights.80 A significant factor for finding the petition legally deficient in 
Campbell was the absence of language clarifying that the proposal would 
restrict current law.81 Despite this finding, the court failed to engage in 
meaningful discussion about whether a reasonable petition signer in 
Alaska would be sufficiently appraised of the current legal landscape 
regarding voter laws to be fully aware of the impact of the PNI, or 
whether she would have to “infer the effect of the proposition from other 
sources.”82 
The court similarly concluded that the PNI petition was deficient 
because it failed to describe that the enforcement mechanism of the 
proposed initiative would impose criminal liability on doctors 
 
(acknowledging that signatures on a deficient summary may be the result of voter 
confusion). 
 77.  See id. at 903 (noting that a reader of the proposition “would have to infer 
the effect of the proposition from other sources” because the proposition was 
ambiguous). 
 78.  Campbell, 232 P.3d at 734; see Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 
129 P.3d at 901 (explaining that circulating a petition for signatures ensure that 
measures on the ballot have garnered sufficient public support). 
 79.  See Campbell, 232 P.3d at 734 (determining that a legally deficient 
summary will not always need to be recirculated). 
 80.  See id. at 730 (concluding that the petition summary was deficient in part 
because it omitted that the PNI would restrict current law). 
 81.  Id. at 728. 
 82.  Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 903; see Campbell, 
232 P.3d at 734 (explaining that petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely because 
the deficient summary did not substantially misrepresent the PNI). 
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performing abortions.83 In dicta, the Medical Marijuana court noted that a 
petition that does not sufficiently describe the scope of a measure could 
be legally deficient because it could be misleading.84 The court should 
have applied that legal reasoning in Campbell. Because felony punishment 
for doctors was the “primary enforcement mechanism” for the PNI, it was 
“a main feature of the initiative.”85 This omission could mislead voters 
because it would create “entirely new legal responsibilities” for 
physicians.86 Like in Medical Marijuana, a voter’s perception of whether 
the initiative imposed narrow or broad obligations could influence her 
vote.87 A reasonable voter would be justified in inquiring who bears the 
burden of enforcement. Because of the potential confusion that could arise 
from the absence of information on enforcement, the petition could 
mislead voters. 
This analysis best serves the initiative process by prioritizing 
informed lawmaking.88 Because the summary was legally deficient, and 
that deficiency could lead to petition signers having to infer the effect of 
the initiative, petition signers “could not know with sufficient certainty 
what they were endorsing.”89 Accordingly, a higher standard for petition-
signer inadvertence would best ensure that measures that go on the ballot 








 83.  Campbell, 232 P.3d at 730. 
 84.  See Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 903 
(“Although we do not have to decide the issue here, we note in passing that the 
text of the proposition might also be misleading in regards to its scope.”). 
 85.  Campbell, 232 P.3d at 730. 
 86.  Brief of Cross-Appellees at 16, Planned Parenthood of Alaska v. 
Campbell, 232 P.3d 725 (2010) (Nos. S–13826, S–13835, S–13845). 
 87.  See Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 903 (“Because 
this ambiguity in the text of the initiative might cause voters to sign the petition 
who would not sign if they perceived the broader possible reading, the text itself 
is potentially problematic.”). 
 88.  See id. at 903 (“The uncertainty created by this lack of context violates the 
principle of informed lawmaking that underlies all petition requirements.”). 
 89.  Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The supreme court’s determination in Campbell that a deficient 
petition summary did not need to be recirculated for signatures created a 
distinction between summaries that are legally insufficient and ones that 
are incapable of serving their intended purpose. However, in creating this 
distinction, the court provided little information on what standards 
guided its decision in Campbell, or how future courts should approach the 
issue. The policy goals that the supreme court has emphasized in the 
initiative context are therefore instructive, particularly the importance of 
ensuring that petition signatures appropriately reflect public support. To 
ensure that signatures are an effective proxy for public support, Alaskan 
courts ought to explicitly consider how misrepresentation in petition 
summaries impact voters’ understanding of the measure. Accordingly, 
while the supreme court erred in Campbell, analyzing petition-signer 
inadvertence with a deliberate focus on the summary’s effect on the voters 
will ensure that informed lawmaking continues to remain central to the 
initiative process. 
 
